The article summarizes the data from a few tens of interviews with entrepreneursrepresentatives of a small business. The purpose of the interview was to discover expectations and suggestions from entrepreneurs to the local and state government. Interview data reveal the profound contradictions between the business and the authorities. These contradictions are based not only on results of the local administration's actions, but also on the specific current status of local (self-)government that makes it impossible to effectively interact with the business. On the other hand, the development of local businesses has led to a peculiar configuration of the business community, also making it difficult to communicate with the authorities. As a result is trying to get protection from the local government that leads to inadmissible merging of business and government and monopolizing of business in almost every district. Direct consequences of such a merging are government inefficiency, lack of incentives for business development, and stagnation. Some "evolutionary stable strategy" has been developed, that does not allow winning any of the actors yet saving them from loses in competition with the outside players. Understanding of the inefficiency and dead-end of such an interaction by some entrepreneurs forces them to raise claims to local authority. Interviews analyses resulted in the list of complaints and suggestions on how to optimize an interaction between the local business and local authorities.
Introduction
The current interaction between the authorities and the local business resembles a wellknown model of interplay from one Russian fairy tale "The Fox and the Crane". Mutual treating does not satisfy either of them and constantly alternates with insults and complaints. The existing interactions are weak, asymmetrical, and unjust; they seem to circulate permanently like this. But there is always a threat that fox will eat the crane. In order to understand the reasons for insults
and complaints, and to analyze an existing interaction from a new angle, we have conducted this research.
The existing relationships between the institutes of local self-government and local business are reputedly not optimal (Peregudov, 2007; Chepurenko, 2008; Vdovenko, 2011) . It may seem that this interplay is just disastrous for the local business (Kordonsky et al., 2011) .
Throughout last 15 years the heads of the local governments, both current and former, have been controlling all the main resources of their districts. Moreover, they have total control over the access to local entrepreneur communities: it is not possible to launch any new project without their approval, even for local people (see: Plusnin et al., 2009) . A certain class relationships have been formed resembling structures of clans or estate society (Kordonsky, 2008 (Kordonsky, , 2010 This total dependence of local business community from the local authorities creates much indignation and does not allow building a stable relationship between them. The disorders of the relationships are determined by the "non-canalized" activity of local (see : Plusnin, 2012 ).
Development of local entrepreneurship -multidirectional and free in its essence -meets constraints of the local government. Government's actions are determined by their personal interests in business rather than by their officially declared duties. This creates a certain bias in business development hampering the progress of businesses of those entrepreneurs who are not included in "governing clan". Quite often it is a real clan consisted of relatives.
This kind of interaction between authorities and business should be classified as segregative, leading to 'institutional deficits' at the local level. Businessmen are trying to change this situation -to get rid of such an injustice. Thereby, they endeavor 'to heal' the economical and social spheres of local societies. Actions of local government that actively hinder these moves are seen as barriers in that progress both by entrepreneurs and the rest of society. At the same time nobody doubts the necessity of police and socio-economic functions performed by the local government. This results in suggestions proposed by active population on how the relationships between the authorities and certain social groups should be modified. These suggestions form 'the list of complaints' that is surprisingly short, but is very pithy, substantial 4 and concerns the basic functions of local government. This allows thinking of a strong, conscious determination of active part of a population to develop a real local authority that will be able to substitute its semblance that exists now.
Hypothesis, methodology and research materials
We have conducted empirical observations in order to define a possibility and directions of constructive dialogue between the institute of local authority and various stakeholders of the local society. Specific targets of the study were: to determine the causes of interaction disturbances and to define the factors contributing to segregative interplay between the local authority and active part of population.
The object of the research is an interaction of local authorities with local society with focus on the (economically) active population. The subject of investigation is perturbations of interaction between local government and active population. Perturbations are manifested in different forms of segregation of active population, primary entrepreneurs. Segregation shows itself in obstructing entrepreneurship by setting different administrative barriers that leads to modifications in conditions for business, or simple blockage of projects development.
Working hypothesis
The 'institutional deficit' in authority-business interaction creates a profound distortion in the whole government system at the local level. It is expected that overcoming this deficit by means of finding and establishing mechanisms of effective interaction between local government and active population will result in a certain development of local authority that is characterized by origination of institute of civil society and its involvement in local governance. This study focuses on:
(1) understanding specific disturbances in the authority-business interaction, and (2) gathering recommendations from the active population on how to correct this situation.
Methodology
Used methodology is based on the structural-functional approach and qualitative sociological analysis that assumes conducting case studies and in-depth interviews. Investigation of interaction between institutes of local authority and local society requires understanding the 5 essence of the problem rather than searching for statistical correlations. That defines the research methods -direct observation and interviews.
Observations
Direct observation requires being at the researched location, observing the everyday life of local society, getting acquainted with local people, their business, and administrative routine that requires a considerable amount of time. Observation data is collected and summarized in partly formal research diaries.
For the purpose of the study 6 North-East districts of Kostroma region (Makariev, Manturovo, Kologriv, Pyschug, Vokhma and Oktyabr'sky) were visited in September and October 2012. The nature of entrepreneurship is similar in all six districts, and the difficulties businessmen have are alike. Management tasks are similar for local authorities in all six districts.
That allows gathering and analyzing data from these six districts altogether.
Interviews
Expert interview with entrepreneurs and officials focused on issues of economic development and initiatives of local society. Interview aimed to reveal peculiarities of interactions between local business and local authority: its nature, mechanisms of communications, problems.
Respondents were interviewed in comfortable, relaxing atmosphere, usually at the respondents' territory. Interviews were recorded with respondents' consent. The duration of interview varied from 20-30 minutes to more than 2 hours, being on average around 40-50 minutes. Interview guide consisted of 45 topics, although interviewers did not have to follow the guide precisely -it was rather important to stress those topics that respondent seemed to be more aware about and interested in. Guide was divided in three blocks:
(1) development of local entrepreneurship (included 23 topics);
(2) development of elementary institutes of civil society as a basis for societyauthority interaction improvement (17 topics); (3) interaction between local authorities and local small business (5 topics).
Every interview was recorded, deciphered and saved as a separate file. All in all 53 interviews with entrepreneurs and officials were conducted, 33 of which were recorded by dictaphone. It is important to mention that some officials were previously businessmen as well as some entrepreneurs had been working in the local administration previously. This allowed some respondents to describe an interaction between authorities and business from both points of view.
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We were primarily looking for those entrepreneurs who are involved in production of goods or provide services. There are only 10 respondents in our study sample who are pure merchants, despite the fact, that entrepreneurs-merchants ratio in real life is around 1:9. In addition to their main business many entrepreneurs also keep shops, so they know situation both in production and sales quite well. In every studied district we also interviewed 3-4 local government employees including heads of administration, and ex-heads when possible.
List of expectations vs list of complaints: inconsistency of views on interaction between business and authorities
Conducted interviews and direct observations allowed to collect a large number of expectations, suggestions and complaints from the entrepreneurs regarding their interactions with the local government and vice versa. The data were summarized in several groups by topics representing the most acute problems. The chart below has two columns where businessmen complaints (on the right) and authorities' expectations (on the left) are listed. Another expectation concerns employment. Local administration expects entrepreneurship to help with job placement of at least some part of able-bodied citizens. In fact, the problem with employment reflects low efficacy of local authority itself.
Analysis of interviews with officials suggests the main reason for such expectations is an assurance of good indices that local authorities have to report to the regional state administration. As there are quite serious complaints from the entrepreneurship and nothing comparable from the side of authorities -it could be concluded that entrepreneurship suffers the most from the current situation (for exs. see: Karpushkina, 2009 ). Here we have an "institutional distortion", the sign of inefficiency of existing interactions (Mochalnikov, 2010) . But real causes of such a distortion in interaction are related to lack of trust to the local administration: 
Complain 1: Administrative barriers for a new business
Despite the twenty years long history of development of small business and existing difficulties, entrepreneurs still see some possibilities for new business projects (Chepurenko, 2008) . Realization of these business opportunities will allow to increase the level of service provided for citizens. However, these business opportunities are under control of the local authorities that rarely show any signs of interest in development of these new options.
«We do have quite many opportunities for good business projects now. But who would help to organize it? That economical department (of local administration) should gather folks and tell them: it is possible to organize this and that, and what is needed for that"
However the local administrations either purposefully or just with the connivance creates different obstacles for new business. It is a well known example when officials run business themselves and hence are not interested in raising competitors (this could be seen almost in every municipality). But they might as well impede development of other business projects, not related to their own. This happens because of simple indifference or due to illegal financial intereststhe result is equally lamentable as citizens cannot get products and services they could have got. Business and local society appeared to be at the same side of the barricades -both were interested in business illegal falling into the shadow as it saves the livelihood."
The local authority is close and easier. But when it starts to block harshly new business enterprises, the local population considers it as illegal ways for fighting the business competitors.
Administrative barriers at best could be considered as signs of shortsightedness, incompetence, stupidity. During our research we, regrettably, elicited many facts of hindering the small business by means of various administrative barriers. This is a very important complain especially now, when local business provides around half of all job sites in municipal district.
And if the employees of budget organizations take around 40-50 percent of all district population, then all the rest are small business workers: 
when. Then they came back after some time -and if you had not eliminated the defectsthen they imposed a fine. And if you had eliminated it -then it's ok, nobody fines you. The purpose of the control inspection is to improve the quality of the work, but not to strip the entrepreneur of everything. And now what? If I want to have good results out of all these inspections -I have to bribe the inspectors!"
The majority of supervising authorities are territorial departments of the federal and regional state governments. Thus, the inspections represent a tool of administrative control over the entrepreneurship (State regulation of entrepreneurship activity, 2009). But the local administration have take an active part in such controlling. If some head of the local administration shows an independence of regional authorities (that is supposed to be according to the law), it risks to get a thorough inspection of his own cabinet and affairs. It runs into absurdity when regional officials visit the local administration along with representatives from the police, Regional administration often give orders to local administration that are impossible to carry out or just useless. For instance, an order to renovate an abandoned building that has no tenants as well as no roof. Or to pave the path towards draw-well in a village with less than 10 inhabited houses located 20 km from the nearest asphalt road. Inspection authorities always find a pretext for such orders: in the former case it is the fact that the house has not been written off on time, whereas in the latter case it is the state law that obliges municipality to make such pavement. The law however misses an important point -the crucial differences between life in big cities and in the countryside. Nevertheless, it always makes small business to pay big fines and local authority to have legal proceedings with risk to be jailed. Wise and experienced heads of administration understand quite well they hardly could do anything to protect local businessmen from this tyranny.
"If you want authority cooperates with business (protect them and all other things) authority has to be powerful first of all. It must have some levers. Or there must be a mutual benefit…like creating municipal co-ownership enterprises -I think this might be a 14 serious incitement. But now there are no relationships at all. Relationships must be secured by the law…"
It is not a common knowledge that most of Russian settlements use seventh part of their budget (and sometimes even more) to remove snow from the roads in winter (for information:
big cities with much bigger budgets do spend around 0.5-1 percent of it for snow removal).
Community services that usually perform this work exist only in large municipalities. In the small ones all this kind of functions -snow removal, disposal of ordure, water and fuel supply 
Complain 3: Excessive bureaucratization
Another problem that also concerns both -small business and local self-government -is an excessive bureaucratization. The inquiries for the document submissions are often duplicated:
"All this bureaucratic runaround must be cut loose. And of course these replicated requests for the same information must be cancelled. Let it be so that I submit one document and it got copied there and moves to all the departments it needs to be. Now I run for twenty times to submit the same paper in different offices".
We think that one of the main reasons for this disorganized activity is the absence of the official municipal statistics as such. It does not exist at all since there is no official law that regulates it (Kordonsky, 2010; 2011) . As a result, the government requires any documents they want from the small business and local authorities basing not on the law, but on the arbitrariness.
Importantly, most of the local entrepreneurs and officials are simply not aware of illegality of such claims. Those single individuals who just by accident have found it out are afraid to refuse these claims: "…because if you refuse them, then they will grip you in a vice big time!".
Thus, entrepreneurs understand this excessive bureaucratization as an attempt of the regional government to make it looks like they do control the situation whereas in reality it is far from it. So the rational suggestion that arisen from it is to shift all the control proceedings down to the local level:
"The local authorities should be in charge of local situation. 
Complain 4: Information deficit
The enormous amount of chaotic reports, rapid alterations of the legislation and frequent changes in the business environment have its positive sides as well. All this makes people to search for answers and to learn new things almost every day. However entrepreneurs say even though such information is essential for business, it takes too much time to look for it. Getting new education in economics, accountantships or management -even though it would be undoubtedly advantageous for the business -is just impossible for businessmen because of lack of time or simple unavailability of such education in the region they work in. So entrepreneurs ask local administration for informational help. Local administration is legally obliged to provide necessary information for population. Entrepreneurs could be given information on fundraising, crediting and solving or avoiding various difficulties in their work. While getting no legal and financial aid from local authorities, the businessmen expect them at least to provide some useful information: For some reasons (one of them is that such advices were purely formal, having no significance for the business) this support of small entrepreneurship by local administration went down. Departments that were consulting businessmen have been closed up one by one.
Associations of entrepreneurs also went down. 
Complain 5: Lack of professionals
Indeed, there is a severe lack of professionals. At the dawn of private entrepreneurship in Russia there were many people with very good soviet professional education. Also, there was no need in uncommon, rare specialties. The situation has changed dramatically since then. Late 2000s and early 2010s were marked with a threatening growth of two serious problems. First, the shortage of professionals in different areas has become very acute for three reasons:
(a) a number of well-educated soviet specialists has decreased during last 20 years by natural reasons;
(b) the system of young specialists assignment was dropped off;
(c) the system of vocational education has been crushed.
Second, technological development has brought many new professions that are necessary for modern business. These professionals are entirely absent in rural areas and there are no educational institutions in there which could prepare them. These are programmers, lawyers, managers, logistic specialists and auditors.
When lack of professionals has just been seen in the provinces firstly in the 90s, an effective solution was found. Local authorities had been paying (from the district budget) for the education of young people who had to return to the district after the graduation and work there for several years. Overall, small business is now got stuck with these acute deficit of specialists and it does not see a way out. The only hope is for local authorities. However they do not want to take up challenges like this.
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What to do? Small business possible strategies in unfavorable conditions
Indeed, what should small business do today? The data we have gathered reveal deep contradictions between business and authority. Some of these contradictions are hidden from the external observer, whereas others are on the surface. Most of these contradictions are based not only on motives and actions of local authority, but also on the specific current status of local government that makes it impossible to effectively interact with local business. The local authority is clamped between the local society which it is supposed to govern and protect, and regional authority which it is not supposed to obey, but from which it is entirely dependent.
Local authority is not just financially dependent on regional administration, but is also under its complete control since regional authority is responsible for local one to the federal power. This total dependence of local authority naturally leads to weakening of its responsibilities for the local society including small business. Local authority does not feel itself being in charge of local entrepreneurship which it actually is obliged to support and develop.
On the other hand, the development of local businesses has led to a peculiar configuration of the business community, also making it difficult to communicate with the authorities.
Peculiarity of contemporary Russian North business is its total focus on the use of natural resources. Single-industry raw material specialization of the entrepreneurship as well as very narrow and underdeveloped segment of service makes entrepreneurs completely dependent on arbitrariness of local authorities. This, however, does not protect them from the territorial invasions and capture of the market by big outside mining and network companies. The local authority could hardly support local entrepreneurs as it has lost control over the distribution of natural resources.
As a result of such two-sided attack local business is trying to get protection from the local authority that leads to business-authority merging. In almost every municipality the largest business belongs to a former or current (through his relatives) head of administration. This leads to inadmissible coalescence of business and administration and consequently to the monopolization of business in almost every municipal district. This coalescence results in authority's inability to create favorable conditions for local business. Also local entrepreneurs loose motivation for the development ("if I know for sure I cannot outrun our administration head in this business -then why would I try that hard?") that leads to stagnation and quite often recession of all entrepreneurship in the municipality.
Some kind of "winning-less evolutionary stable strategy" has been developed, that does not allow either of the actors to get advantage. The model of interaction indeed resembles the plot of famous Russian fairytale "The Fox and the Crane": everyone expects from the other something different that he could offer. However this strategy also saves them both from losing in competition with the outside players. That is why being minimal it is still stable. If the existing situation in district is not disturbed by any external influences that could significantly change the current relationship between the authority and business, these relationship could last ad infinitum. There are such examples everywhere: in majority of districts the "leading clans" have been governing for 15-20 years and even since the Soviet times. They also control all the local business.
At the same time understanding of the inefficiency and dead-end of such an interaction by some entrepreneurs forces them to raise claims to the local authority. It is ruefully that the "list of claims" although being short looks really depressing: "it is impossible to launch business, impossible to run it, impossible to develop it". And behind all three impossibilities is the institute that was assigned -as an institute of local authority -for creation of the environment maximally favorable for the local business. Since only this active part of society -and not at all the government with its social security programs -is able to set up economic advancement, establish well-grounded householding and secure the social stability.
